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APPLICATION OF BEST PRACTICES
A Primer on Cognitive Errors Illustrated through the Lens of 
a Neurosurgical Practice
Jeffrey Florman MD,1 Lisa Almeder MD,2 Robert L. Trowbridge MD2
1Department of Surgery, Maine Medical Center, Portland, ME, 2Department of Medicine, Maine Medical Center, Portland, 
ME
 Diagnostic error is often attributed to cognitive errors, including biased thinking patterns, rather than 
knowledge or data limitations. Education on cognitive bias deserves review in all spheres of practice.
Background:  The cognitive biases of practitioners create an inherent fallibility in recognizing and treating medical 
conditions. Awareness of these cognitive errors is valuable for mitigating risk of diagnostic error. 
Cognitive error substantially impacts the management of neurosurgically relevant disease. Remarkably, 
broad differential diagnoses often accompany neurologic symptoms. Both focal and non-focal 
symptoms contribute to diagnostic inertia that can lead to errors. Further, initial diagnostic direction 
can be inaccurate in the involved biological system, anatomic localization, and the pathologic process. 
This inaccuracy can delay diagnosis and lead to severe consequences. We present clinically relevant 
vignettes of neurosurgical cases that illustrate the major types of unconscious cognitive errors in 
medicine, as well as strategies to mitigate cognitive error.
Application:  Awareness of the types of cognitive errors and debiasing strategies is valuable for avoiding faulty 
estimates of disease likelihood, overlooking all relevant possibilities, and mitigating errors in critical 
thinking. Recognizing that all clinicians are vulnerable to cognitive error is of foundational importance in 
the strategies to reduce biases. These errors in medicine can be addressed by strategically working to 
reduce bias and increase discipline in clinical reasoning.
Keywords:  cognitive error, diagnostic error, cognitive bias, neurosurgery
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Error in medicine, like entropy, is inevitable. The 
human mind is inherently fallible. It has evolved to 
function efficiently by relying heavily on incomplete 
evidence and depending on mental shortcuts 
(heuristics) to make decisions. Heuristics, although 
efficient and often helpful, may fail. Thus, we 
continue to risk experiencing the limitations of 
processes in clinical decision-making.
Most medical judgments and actions appear 
appropriate, rational, and sometimes even easy 
at the time, but our cognitive machinery limits our 
ability to completely avoid unconscious errors of 
reasoning. As evidenced by diagnostic error in 
particular, cognitive errors contribute substantially 
to patient harm and yet are often unrecognized.5 
Thus, practitioners must use a steady, reflective, 
and skilled approach to counter these forces and 
avoid error. Although these phenomena have 
received increased attention over the past decade, 
most of the literature has centered on emergency 
and adult medicine. While there has been little 
discussion or application of these issues to the 
surgical specialties, including neurosurgery, there 
is nothing to suggest that such disciplines are not 
equally subject to biases and erroneous thinking.
BACKGROUND
The “dual process model” is a useful construct to 
help understand the mental modes by which we 
perform and what processes may underlie some 
of our cognitive failures. This problem- solving and 
decision-making   theory provides a scheme of 
processing by which we (1) make acute judgments 
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in an automatic, intuitive, and unconscious fashion, 
and (2) facilitate reasoned choices using a slower, 
logical and more analytic conscious mode.1,2 The 
former is a mainstay of decision-making: it acts 
quickly and  intuitively,  and its strength is in its 
efficient and effortless manner. The latter is a 
slow and effortful process that provides deliberate 
reasoning. Both processes are at the mercy of 
the data presented, but inherent cognitive biases 
further threaten to corrupt their conclusions. 
Clinical reasoning is influenced by the patient and 
the environment, including the time-pressures of 
clinical practice. Thus, studying cognitive bias could 
be valuable for improving the process.1,3,4
Although the exact contribution of specific cognitive 
biases to errors is often unclear, their etiology likely 
goes beyond a knowledge deficit and represents a 
“failure of judgment.” Yet, most efforts in medical 
education do not focus on instruction in clinical 
reasoning, critical thinking, and metacognitive 
skills.4,6 To date, most efforts to improve cognitive 
errors have centered in internal medicine and 
emergency medicine, even though surgical 
specialties are equally at risk. Here, we use a 
neurosurgical perspective to evaluate how cognitive 
bias impacts medical error.
Neurosurgical practice is distinguished by an 
exposure to a diverse patient population, caregivers 
across many specialties, demands on physical and 
cognitive practice, and an extraordinary spectrum 
of pathology, gravity, acuity, and risk. These factors 
provide a valuable, and perhaps unique, perspective 
from which to view error.  Clinical neurosurgery 
is not unique in its demands for shrewdness, 
but it unmasks the gamut of common cognitive 
biases. While recognizing that a knowledge deficit 
can simultaneously contribute to error, we use 
neurosurgical cases to describe common types of 
bias and explore debiasing strategies.  See Table 1 
for common types of biases. 
COMMON TYPES OF COGNITIVE 
BIAS ILLUSTRATED WITH 
VIGNETTES
1. Premature closure and search satisficing
Case
A 55-year-old female with a history of breast cancer 
presents to her primary care physician with several 
weeks of pain in the bilateral buttocks extending to 
the posterior thighs. The results of the exam are 
benign, except for slight hesitation during muscle 
testing. Her doctor clinically diagnoses a lumbar 
disc herniation, recommends anti-inflammatory 
medications, and refers her to physical therapy. 
Table 2 describes the differential diagnosis for 
sciatica. After the pain persists, she undergoes 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which reveals 
sacral metastasis.
Bias illustrated
Premature closure refers to the tendency to settle on 
a diagnosis and cease all diagnostic efforts before 
that diagnosis has been reasonably established. It is 
often driven by intolerance of uncertainty, the desire 
of clinicians and patients to have an explanation, 
and perceived time pressures. Premature closure is 
closely related to search satisficing, or the tendency 
to cease diagnostic efforts after some form of 
explanation is found, even if that explanation is not 
good (i.e., the explanation “suffices”). Colloquially, 
premature closure is often described as “when 
the diagnosis is made, the thinking stops.”7 In this 
case, imaging is needed to definitively diagnose 
the herniated disc and rule out malignancy, but the 
clinician “called off the search” before adequately 
considering a significant aspect of the patient’s 
presentation (the history of breast cancer).
2. Framing bias and diagnostic momentum
Case
A neurosurgeon evaluates an elderly man for 
one week of painless foot drop in the setting of 
chronic back problems and a history of L5S1 
spondylolisthesis. The results of an MRI reveals no 
change from previous scans showing “significant 
but stable L5 nerve root compression that would be 
concordant with foot drop.” The patient undergoes 
uneventful lumbar fusion surgery. However, the 
weakness ascends over the following weeks to 
involve the more diffuse lower extremity. Additional 
workup demonstrates a parasagittal brain tumor 
compressing the motor cortex.
Bias illustrated
Framing bias describes how diagnostic thinking is 
affected by the context the clinician is exposed to or 
constructs in evaluating the patient. This bias may 
be the result of patient actions, such as the patient 
who attributes a new symptom to a chronic problem 
and suggests this attribution to the clinician. It 
may also be due to clinician actions, such as the 
physician who strongly suggests a diagnosis when 
referring a patient to a consultant, thus influencing 
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intraspinal tumor (eg, metastasis, schwannoma)
extraspinal tumor (eg, sciatic nerve tumor)
piriformis syndrome
muscle spasm
peripheral nerve entrapment (eg, superior cluneal nerve, carpal tunnel)
extremity joint pathology (eg, trauma, infection, arthritis)
neuritis (eg, diabetic neuropathy, plexopathy)
peripheral vascular ischemia 
venous thrombosis
malingering
Table 1. Common Cognitive Biases
Bias Description
1. Premature Closure Clinician settles on diagnosis before the data necessary to establish a diagnosis is available
2. Framing Bias Patient’s pre-existing condition or other clinicians' impression over-influences thinking
3. Confirmation Bias Clinician only orders tests or interventions that are likely to affirm favored diagnosis  
4. Availability Bias Clinician arrives at a diagnosis by the ease with which it comes to mind
5. Affective Bias Clinicians emotional state or relationship with patient  influences diagnostic reasoning 
3
Florman et al.: Cognitive Errors
Published by MaineHealth Knowledge Connection, 2020
the consultant’s thinking. A clinician’s perception of 
risk or severity of illness may also influence their 
thinking. The term “diagnostic momentum” reflects a 
common form of framing bias in which an upstream 
provider suggests a diagnosis and subsequent 
clinicians accept this diagnosis without skepticism, 
adequate verification, or further investigation. 
In this case, the patient was “framed” as having 
nerve impingement secondary to the known L5S1 
spondylolisthesis, despite the new clinical findings 
in the setting of stable radiographic results. The 
painless presentation is widely known as atypical for 
lumbar radiculopathy. The presence of the “known” 
disease likely influences the cognitive processes of 
the evaluating clinician.
3. Confirmation bias and anchoring
Case
An adult patient with a history of opioid use 
disorder presents to the emergency room with 
escalating postoperative pain 2 weeks after lumbar 
discectomy. The results of the exam reveal that the 
patient looks uncomfortable but has no fever, an 
unremarkable incision, and no neurologic deficit. 
After discussion with the neurosurgeon, the pain is 
attributed to inadequate opioid dosing. The patient 
is discharged with an increased opioid prescription, 
but he returns 1 day later septic with pus expressing 
from the surgical wound.
Bias illustrated
Anchoring refers to the tendency to latch on to one 
or more prominent or salient features of a patient 
presentation and establish a diagnosis without 
adequate verification. This bias may be particularly 
prevalent with laboratory or imaging findings given 
that they appear more definitive and less nebulous 
than historical findings. Anchoring is closely related 
to confirmation bias, in which a clinician only 
pursues testing that is likely to affirm their diagnostic 
impression. In this case, the evaluating clinicians 
likely anchored on the known opioid dependency 
with concomitant low pain-tolerance, opioid-
induced hyperalgesia, or pain medication-seeking 
behavior. A more thorough approach to ruling out 
infection might have been pursued in the absence 
of the opioid abuse disorder.
4. Availability bias
Case
A 12-year-old presents with 1 week of mild 
headache, nausea, and intermittent vomiting to her 
pediatrician. The results of their exam are benign, 
although tandem gait is not tested. The patient 
and family are reassured that the symptoms are 
likely from flu and prescribed over-the-counter 
symptomatic treatment with instructions to return 
if symptoms worsen. Over the following days, 
the child becomes increasingly lethargic and 
imbalanced, leading to brain imaging that revealed 
a large posterior fossa tumor with hydrocephalus.
Bias illustrated
Availability bias refers to the tendency to prioritize 
diagnoses by the ease with which they come to 
mind. It is often a helpful heuristic that underlies 
much appropriate clinical thought. However, 
availability may cause problems when diagnoses 
that are most “available” because of common, 
recent, or memorable experiences rise to the top, 
even when they are not the most likely. A clinician 
may strongly consider a recently missed diagnosis 
in a subsequent patient on the basis of availability, 
even if there is little to support it. In this case, a 
complete neurologic exam should have included 
tandem gait testing, which might have exposed 
a relevant deficit. This case demonstrates the 
“double-edged sword” of availability: when correct, 




A clinician sees a coworker’s significant other, who 
is also a friend with known alcohol use disorder, in a 
consultation for mid-back pain and mild abdominal 
pain. Reassurance is given and physical therapy is 
ordered following a spine MRI with normal results. 
Progressive back pain and abdominal pain with 
subsequent emesis lead to a laboratory diagnosis 
of acute pancreatitis.
Bias illustrated
Affective bias occurs when a clinician’s own mood 
or their feelings toward a patient impacts their 
diagnostic reasoning. Although many clinicians 
would like to view themselves as dispassionate 
scientists who are immune to emotions when 
approaching diagnosis, all clinicians react 
emotionally to (and have emotions about) their 
situations and other individuals. In this case, the 
clinician’s closeness to the patient may have led 
to hesitation in considering a diagnosis related to 
alcohol use disorder. The absence of emotion may 
have led to an objective evaluation and broader 
4
Journal of Maine Medical Center, Vol. 2 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://knowledgeconnection.mainehealth.org/jmmc/vol2/iss2/4
DOI: 10.46804/2641-2225.1054
differential diagnosis, including pancreatitis in the 




Devising effective educational programs to 
counteract or even detect cognitive bias and errors 
has proven challenging.2,8,9 Clinical reasoning is 
largely subconscious. Even expert clinicians well- 
versed in the mechanics of clinical reasoning may 
struggle to describe their thought processes or 
identify factors that influence their conclusions. 
Furthermore, hindsight bias may corrupt the 
analysis of cases and skew observations. For 
example, the same clinical thought process may 
be seen as based in beneficial heuristics when the 
outcome was favorable but as skewed by biases 
when the outcome was unfavorable. Given the 
obscurity of clinical thought, it is not surprising that 
there are a lack of established intellectual tools and 
strategies for debiasing. Yet, there is increasing 
literature on debiasing strategies and how they may 
be incorporated into clinical practice.
Key steps in improving diagnostic reliability include 
the incorporation of medical education curriculum 
designed to develop explicit clinical reasoning 
abilities and raise awareness of the fallibility of 
clinical reasoning and cognitive bias. Tools for the 
medical educator have been designed to assess and 
facilitate formative feedback on clinical reasoning. 
There is also an increasing emphasis on clinical 
reasoning at the undergraduate and graduate 
medical education levels.6 Yet, to be successful, 
programs to improve cognitive performance must 
also reach practicing physicians, many of whom 
trained in an era when admitting fallibility and 
imperfection was frowned upon or counter to the 
culture. Debiasing requires explicit effort and begins 
with humility as a tool for acknowledging uncertainty, 
combating overconfidence, and introducing a spirit 
of heightened curiosity and wonder into practice. 
While true mastery should be the goal, it may not 
be obtainable.  Instead, students and teachers 
of clinical reasoning should strive for the well- 
calibrated mind.3,10
Debiasing strategies may take multiple forms that 
fall into three categories: cognitive, motivational, 
and technological. Cognitive strategies  are 
designed to improve clinician thought processes, 
motivational hold clinicians accountable for their 
efforts, and technological leverage technology-
based interventions to improve cognition) (Table 
3).8 Many debiasing strategies pertinent to the 
individual clinician fall into the cognitive category. 
Most simply, the individual practitioner needs to 
develop metacognitive abilities to assess their own 
mental state and its potentially negative influence 
on reasoning abilities.
Part of self-assessment to maintain performance 
should also include attentiveness to levels of fatigue, 
sleep deprivation, stress, and cognitive load.1 
Cognitive load represents the attention needed 
to complete a cognitive task and the extraneous 
factors placed on the brain by the environment in 
which decisions are made. The lack of awareness 
or ability to modulate cognitive load is increasingly 
recognized as a major cause of cognitive error. 
Inattention to cognitive load could increase the 
likelihood of premature closure, framing bias, 
anchoring, and availability bias. For example, as 
described in the first case vignette with the patient 
with sciatica, a clinician might prematurely accept 
a diagnosis as sufficient for closure of a workup, 
in part, because of fatigue. Similarly, cognitive 
load could have contributed to the availability bias 
demonstrated in the fourth vignette with the 12 year 
old whose nausea and headache was misdiagnosed 
as the flu.
Although one’s ability to recognize their own biases 
is debated, there should be little controversy that 
being able to recognize the propensity for bias in 
one’s colleagues could improve clinical reasoning. 
For example, in the fifth vignette, imagine that 
another clinician without relationship to the patient 
observed the interaction between the patient 
and clinician. A lack of emotional connection to 
the patient might have immediately exposed the 
affective bias. Overall, an algorithmic approach to 
avoiding bias relies on three steps: being aware of 
of bias, learning to detect it, and giving motivation to 
correct  it with sustained alternate strategies.10 Three 
specific actions which may minimize preventable 
errors in cognitive processing include: increasing 
knowledge,  improving  deliberate   consideration 
in decision-making, and seeking help from other 
people or tools.5
Pragmatic efforts to mitigate bias often focus on 
decoupling rapid intuitive processing from slower 
and more deliberate decision-making.1,4 For 
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example, “forcing functions” are interruptions that 
induce consideration of alternative possibilities, 
which ideally entail clinicians do 4 things: 1. step back 
from the immediate problem, 2.decrease reliance 
on memory, 3. gather  additional  information,  4. 
apply metacognitive steps, or otherwise constrain 
their responses.13 Meaningful techniques 
expand the view  during  the  diagnostic  process 
or encourage reflection. These  techniques 
include  making  checklists,  using  algorithms, 
and using technologically based interventions, 
such as diagnostic  decision-support  systems 
and differential diagnosis generators. Adopting a 
practice of slowing down and performing diagnostic 
“time-outs” involves simply pausing to consider if the 
intuitive diagnosis is validated by a more deliberate 
effort.4,8,14,15 The practice of time-outs can involve 
pausing to ask what the worst-case scenario might 
be, whether there is anything not concordant with 
the working diagnosis, or if there could be multiple 
processes at play. Practical tools can be adopted 
to resist susceptibility to cognitive bias, which 
can be supported by enlisting others as partners 
in the diagnostic process.4 In addition, clarifying 
accountability is a valuable workplace strategy. By 
explicitly assigning roles, care team members may 
become better partners in recognizing and avoiding 
bias.
Improving the reflective abilities of the individual 
clinician, however, is unlikely to have a significant 
impact, unless clinical teams can impact and achieve 
improvements in the practice environment and 
workflows to deliver care. A learning environment 
is an important companion, especially when 
embedded in a culture that prioritizes safety, civility, 
and respect. Interventions can help to establish 
a safe culture, including team training, executive 
and interdisciplinary rounding, and comprehensive 
safety programs.11 Academic or extended care 
team models must consider  complex  dynamics  to 
mitigate biased thinking, such as student, resident, 
and advanced practitioners erroneously initiating, 
failing to challenge, or perpetuating errors. 
Further, promoting an environment that alleviates 
or minimizes time-pressures, interruptions, and 
distractions could decrease the likelihood of 
cognitive error. Awareness of cognitive load may 
similarly help with “right-sizing” the clinical load.12 
Together, optimizing clinician and institutional ethos 
can help to expose cognitive bias and reduce 
errors.4,8
CONCLUSION
The practice of medicine is an indefatigable dynamic 
between the altruistic determinations of smart, 
hard-working, and knowledgeable people and the 
elusiveness of diagnosing and treating disease. 
Table 3. Examples of Debiasing Strategies
Motivational Cognitive Technological
Ensure feedback on 
decisions
Develop awareness of 
cognitive fallibility
Self-assess levels of fatigue 
and stress
Computerized systems to 
support clinical decisions
Clarify team 














Seek help from coworkers Differential diagnosis generators
Use “diagnostic time-
outs” 
Assess affective component 
of physician-patient 
relationship
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This process requires a special mix of knowledge, 
judgment, and humanistic skills that are necessary, 
but not sufficient, to avoid errors. Understanding 
cognitive bias provides a construct and vocabulary 
to explain how thinking can go wrong despite sound 
knowledge and evolved algorithms. Reasoning 
abilities expand from the exercise and practice 
of “meta thinking,” which involves monitoring and 
regulating thought by reflecting on, analyzing, and 
critiquing ones’ own reasoning.   Metacognition 
is reasoning while deliberately engaging in and 
examining available data.  It invokes the power 
of the slower logical system in the dual process 
model. The value of the effort required to reflect 
and analyze beyond using speedy shortcuts, such 
as heuristics, is amplified by practice and debiasing 
tools. In other words, making mistakes in medicine 
is inevitable and can be resisted by knowledge of 
cognitive error, tools to combat it, and a culture that 
is understanding and supportive.
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